Eco-labels are part of a new wave of environmental policy that emphasizes information disclosure as a tool to induce environmentally friendly behaviors by both firms and consumers. Eco-labels are often developed by third-parties separate to the industries that produce and sell the eco-product to create credibility. The goal of these agencies is to reduce the information asymmetry between producers and consumers over the environmental attributes of a good. However, by focusing on this information asymmetry, rather than how the label meets consumer needs, agencies may develop eco-labels that send an irrelevant, confusing or detrimental message to consumers. In a discrete choice experiment we examine two similar eco-labels for wine, one associated with a quality reduction and the other not. The majority of respondents in our study were unaware of the difference between the labels. We found that respondents preferred eco-labeled wines over an otherwise identical counterpart, when the price was low and the wine was from a low quality region. However these preferences were reversed if the wine was expensive and from a high quality region. These results indicate that respondents obtain some warm glow value from eco-labeled wine, but also interpret it as a signal of low quality. This provides a clear lesson for policy makers that focusing purely on information asymmetries will not necessarily create eco-labels that align eco-products with the needs of consumers.
Introduction
Eco-labels are part of a new wave of environmental policies that emphasize information disclosure as a tool to induce environmentally friendly behaviors by both firms and consumers (Dietz & Stern, 2002) . The goal of eco-labels is to reduce the information asymmetry between producers and consumers over the environmental attributes of a good (Crespi & Marette, 2005; Leire & Thidell, 2005) . Prominent examples of eco-labels include the USDA organic label for agricultural products, the Energy Star label for energy appliances, and the Forest Sustainable Stewardship label for lumber. The number of eco-labels programs on the market has proliferated from a mere dozen worldwide in the 1990s to more than 377 programs in 2010. 1 The corresponding market for eco-labeled products has grown significantly in value over the same time period, with products like organic fruit and vegetables capturing 12 percent of the U.S. market in 2010 (Organic Trade Association, 2011) .
Eco-labels are often developed by government agencies and non-governmental organizations which are separate to the industries that produce and sell the eco-product. This third-party certification lends credibility to the eco-labels (D'Souza et al, 2006; Leire & Thidell, 2005; Nillson et al, 2004) , but may result in eco-labels that do not meet the needs of, or are even detrimental to producers (de Boer, 2003; Rex and Bauman, 2007; Stern, 1999) . This difference stems from the informational goals of producers and labelers.
Producers wish to use information over environmental attributes to match their products to the needs of consumers (Peattie, 2001) , whereas the third-parties who actually issue the labels aim to close the information asymmetry between producers and consumers (de Boer, 2003; Rex and Bauman, 2007; Stern, 1999) . While these two goals may sometimes align, creating increased demand for eco-labeled products (Teisl et al, 2002; Bjorner et al, 2004) , this is not always the case. Many studies have found that eco-labels do not deliver the desired message, resulting in consumers who are unsure of the extra value that the eco-label presents (Nillson et al, 2004; Yiridoe et al, 2005) ; who are confused by distinctions between different eco-labels (Leire & Thidell, 2005; Bhaskaran et al, 2006) ; who do not match the eco-label to environmental problems (Van Amstel, 2008; Teisl et al, 2004) and who associate the eco-label with negative product attributes (Delmas & Grant, 2010; Rivera, 2002) .
In this paper we run a discrete choice experiment over eco-labeled and non-eco-labeled wine to investigate circumstances where eco-labels may send insufficient or undesired information to consumers. The US wine market is particularly suited for this type of investigation due to both institutional and product characteristics.
Institutionally, the government agency responsible for food-related eco-labels, the USDA, has created two very similar eco-labels, one of which is legitimately associated with product concerns and one which is not.
In terms of product, wine is a processed good, making the consumer health aspect of eco-labeling less clear and potentially obfuscating the link between consumer needs and environmental attributes. Moreover wine is a differentiated product with a variety of characteristics, all of which may interact with or cancel out the signal that the eco-label sends. In our study, 830 participants from across the United States made a series of choices, where they selected between hypothetically purchasing one of four graphical representations of wine bottles, or nothing. This method allowed us to randomly vary wine attributes, price and eco-label, thereby revealing the full range of consumers' preferences, rather than the subset circumscribed by existing market choices. This discrete-choice exercise was combined with a survey that allowed us to link attitudes, demographics and behavior to wine choices.
We find that consumers prefer eco-labeled wine at low prices, but prefer non-eco-labeled wine at high prices. Since price acts as a signal of quality in the wine industry (Lockshin et al, 2006; Mtimet & Albisu, 2006) , we interpret this as meaning that consumers interpret eco-labels as a signal of low quality. Support for this is found when we separately examine the two different eco-labels, one of which is legitimately associated with quality concerns. We find that consumers who are unaware of the difference between the two labels penalize high priced wines bearing either eco-label. However, consumers who know the difference between the two eco-labels, only penalize high priced wines bearing the eco-label associated with quality concerns. This paper contributes to the growing literature on information disclosure as an environmental policy tool, by showing the adverse effects of considering information alone a sufficient tool. Additionally, our findings present a valuable lesson for the policy makers who utilize and frame information disclosure policies. An eco-label premium is essential for an eco-industry to sustainably exist. Thus any eco-labeling initiative needs to ensure that it will deliver such premiums. Focusing purely on information asymmetries will not necessarily create eco-labels that align eco-products with the needs of consumers. Instead government organizations need to work with producers and marketers to ensure that eco-labels provide information that clearly communicate their value to consumers. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we explore the existing literature on eco-labels.
In Section 3 we present a model of eco-label choice that includes quality signals. Section 4 presents our testable hypotheses, while section 5 discusses the methodology behind our discrete choice exercise. In section 6 we develop an econometric framework for analyzing the experiment, the implementation of which is presented in section 7. Our results are shown in section 8 with concluding comments and discussion given in section 9.
Information policies
Information disclosure policies are increasingly gaining prominence as a "new tool" in environmental management policies (Dietz & Stern, 2002) . These policies augment or replace government regulation by publicly providing information that will presumably assist more cost effective private and legal forces (Delmas et al, 2010) . Environmental information disclosure policies can be instituted at either the firm, product or consumer level. Firm level information policies normally entail voluntary or mandatory disclosure policies (ibid) . Common examples include the toxics release inventory, lead paint disclosures, drinking water quality notices, and the International Standards Organization's voluntary ISO 14001 program. Empirically research into corporate disclosure has yielded mixed results. Jin and Leslie (2003) found that mandatory hygiene cards positively affected restaurant quality and health outcomes, while Delmas, Montes-Sancho & Shimshack (2009) found that mandatory disclosure over utility electricity generation mixes resulted in an increase in cleaner fuels. However, Lyon and Kim (2011) found that firms participating in Department of Energy's Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry engaged in 'green-washing', by selectively reporting emission reductions when overall firm emissions were increasing. Information polices at the consumer level entail providing better information over the unobservable environmental impact of a consumer's behavior (Delmas & Lessem, 2011) . This information can be feedback over their own behavior, social norms over aggregate behavior, or publicly disclosed information about a specific individual's behavior. In a number of studies in the electricity industry, improved feedback over an individual's own electricity usage has been shown to reduce electricity consumption by 4 to 12 percent on average (Darby, 2006; Abrahamse et al, 2005; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al, 2010) , although many studies report finding no or perverse effects (Kihm et al, 2010 : Klos et al, 2008 Allen & Janda, 2006; Sulyma et al, 2008; Sexton et al., 1987) . Information over social norms has been shown to be effective at inducing conservation in a number of settings, including: recycling (Schultz, 1999) , towel re-use (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius, 2008) , litter reduction (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990) , water conservation (Ferraro & Price, 2011) and energy conservation (Schultz et al, 2007; Ayers et al, 2009; Allcot, 2010; Costa & Kahn, 2011) .
Eco-labels are the prime example of a product level information policy. The aim of eco-labels is to reduce the information asymmetry between producers and consumers that arises since consumers are not present during the production of the product and therefore cannot assess its environmental qualities. Attributes such as environmental quality, which cannot be verified before or after purchase, are called credence attributes (Darby & Karni, 1973) . Credible eco-labels transform credence attributes into search attributes, where search attributes, such as color, size or price, can be identified by consumers prior to purchase (Nelson, 1970; Sammer & Wüstenhagen, 2006) . The term eco-label commonly refers to a producer's right to use a symbol or phrase on their product labels, after passing a voluntary third-party environmental certification (Leire & Thidell, 2005; Rex & Bauman 2007) . The International Standards Office (ISO) gives a broader description of eco-labels, classifying them as either mandatory or voluntary, with voluntary split into three types. The commonly used eco-label definition above would be categorized as Type I, whereas Type II are self-declared environmental claims and Type III are quantified environmental claims, usually to do with the lifecycle impact of the product.
The primary question that has occupied researchers over eco-labels, is whether consumers value eco-production and actually use it as a search attribute in purchasing products. Teisl et al (2002) found a premium for dolphin safe tuna using U.S. supermarket scanner data, although identification is not clear since there is no cross sectional variation in certification. Looking at apparel catalogues, Nimon and Beghin (1999) found an eco-label premium for organic cotton clothing, but not for low impact dyes. Using a panel of weekly shopping data for Scandinavian consumers, Bjorner et al (2004) found that the Nordic Swan eco-label increased the probability of purchase for toilet paper and paper towels, but not detergents. In a study of eco-labeled hotels in Costa Rica, Rivera (2002) found that eco-labels generated a price premium for the top rated eco-hotels (based on a green leaf rating), but generated an eco-penalty for hotels with lower eco-ratings compared to uncertified hotels. In a discrete choice experiment, Sammer & Wüstenhagen (2006) found that Swiss consumers are willing to pay more for better energy efficiency ratings on washing machines.
In the market for wine several studies have investigated willingness to pay for eco-labeled wine, although these studies for the most part rely on surveys rather than experiments or real-world data. Loureiro (2003) surveyed consumers on their willingness to pay for eco-labeled Colorado wines and finds a 13 cent price premium on a $10 bottle of wine, over non-eco-labeled Colorado wine. Bazoche et al (2008) used wine auctions to elicit willingness to pay for eco-labeled wine in France interacted with an information treatment over pesticide usage in wine production. The authors found neither an eco-label premium nor an information effect, although their experiment was possibly limited by a lack of a proper wine control group (the eco-labeled wines were of a different brand and quality to the non-eco-labeled wines). Brugarolas et al (2009) surveyed Spanish consumers about whether they would pay a premium for organic wine and found that 75 percent would be willing. Similarly Forbes et al (2009) found that 73% of surveyed New Zealand consumers reported that they would choose an eco-labeled wine over a similar non-eco-labeled wine.
Although in a follow up study Forbes et al (2011) found that consumers were less expressed less concern about the impact of wine production on the environment than food production in general.
A model of product choice with eco-labels
Green products have been defined as "impure public goods" because they yield both public and private benefits (Cornes & Sandler, 1996; Ferraro, Uchida, & Conrad, 2005; Kotchen, 2006) . Altruistic consumers, who care about the environment, may receive a good feeling or "warm glow" from engaging in environmentally friendly activities that contribute to this public good (Andreoni 1990) . Such warm glow altruism has been shown to be a significant motivator of eco-consumption amongst environmentally minded consumers (Clarke et al, 2003; Kotchen & Moore, 2007; Kahn & Vaughn, 2009) , with green consumption acting as a substitute for donations to environmental organization (Kotchen, 2005) . On the private good side, consumers care about the quality of the product. Green products may offer quality advantages over their brown counterparts such as increased health benefits (Loureiro et al, 2001; Miles and Frewer, 2001; Yridoe et al, 2005) , but they may also suffer from quality problems such as archaic production and farming techniques (Galarraga Gallastegui, 2002; Peattie & Crane, 2005) .
Since green products (G) are credence goods; consumers cannot ascertain their environmental qualities during purchase or use. Some consumers who are concerned about the environment or their health may prefer these products, but in the absence of further information are unable are unable to determine their environmental qualities of the product at the time of purchase. A credible eco-label ( L ) can solve this problem by reducing this information assymetry between consumers and producers.
The utility of consumer i purchasing product j depends on both the quality ) ( j q and price price ) ( j p of the good, with i  being a measure of price sensitivity for the individual. If the product is green ( j G ) and the consumer is an environmentalist ( 0 > i  ), then the consumer will derive additional utility from it only if
). Since product quality is unknown prior to consumption, consumers will make inferences over the product's quality from observable signals such as products price, label characteristics and the eco-label itself.
Consumer perceptions of the virtues of green production,  , can be positive or negative, depending on the product. Price ( j p ) may also act as a positive signal of quality (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986) . We model this signal as diminishing with price, so that
We are interested in the case, where at low prices, the increased quality from a change in price outweighs the disutilty of having to pay the price. Thus we restrict the model so that
. Finally other product attributes (vector J O ) may influence the quality assessment, with vector  entering in positively or negatively depending on the attribute and product. Substituting equation 2 into into our utility function in equation 1 we get:
Equation 3 shows that the additional quality signal that an eco-label carries can further add to its appeal ( 0 >  ) or diminish it ( 0 <  ). If 0 >  then all consumers will prefer the eco-labeled green product to its otherwise identical brown counterpart. However, if 0   then only the subset of environmentally concerned consumers whose taste for eco-products is so strong that    > i will prefer the green product.
In the model above, we assumed that the quality signals act independantly of each other. However, there may be interactions between the various quality signals with the signals amplifying or diminishing each other. Since we are interested in eco-labels we restrict these interactions to those between eco-labels and other quality signals.
Substituting equation 4 into the utility function in equation 1 yields:
As before, all consumers will prefer an eco-labeled green product over its brown counterpart when green production is viewed as being of a higher quality ( 0 <  ). However , if 0   then the share of consumer who prefer the green product will decrease as price and other measures of quality increase. This is because consumers will only purchase the green product when ]
Hypotheses
The two models above give us a number of testable hypotheses. Since we are interested in the class of eco-products where eco-labels send a potentially negative quality signal, we restrict our hypotheses to those involving the cases where perceived quality is negative or zero.
H1: There is an absolute preference for eco-labeled products over non-eco-labeled products, which does not vary across price and other quality signals.
H2: There is a relative preference for eco-labeled products over non-eco-labeled products, which varies negatively with price and other quality signals, when eco-labeled products are perceived as lower quality.
H3: Environmentally minded consumers will prefer eco-labeled products over non-eco-labeled products.
Hypothesis 1 follows directly from equation 3 and says that for two similar products, those consumers whose environmental ideology exceeds the negative quality signal of the eco-label, will prefer the eco-labeled good regardless of the characteristics of the two products. Hypothesis 2 says that the share of consumers who prefer an eco-labeled product over an otherwise identical counterpart will vary with the characteristics of the product. In particular, the highest share of consumers will prefer the eco-labeled product when other quality signals are low. This is because they value the eco-labeled product's environmental attributes, and are unconcerned about the eco-label quality signal, since they have already inferred that quality is low. However as price and other quality signals increase, the share of consumers who prefer the eco-labeled product will decrease, since the low quality signal that the eco-label sends out is now more informative. This follows directly from equation 5.
We test these hypotheses by conducting an online discrete choice experiment, where consumers chose between eco-labeled and non-eco-labeled wines.
Methodology
To examine consumer preferences over eco-labels and other quality signals we ran an online discrete choice exercise, also known as a choice-based conjoint (CBC) exercise. CBC is a useful analytic technique for evincing consumer preferences in that it mirrors real-world choices as closely as possible, while still allowing the experimenter to randomize across prices and product attributes in a way that is not possible with real-world data. It also allows the experimenter to examine only those product attributes most relevant to the study. In our discrete choice exercise, consumers were shown images of four different wine bottle labels and asked to choose between them. They also had the option of choosing not to purchase any of the bottles on display, making the exercise more realistic (Louviere et al. 2000) . Similar experiments on wine choice had variously examined the influence of medals (Lockshin et al, 2006) , region of designation (Mtimet & Albisu, 2006) and back label information (Mueller et al, 2010) . In addition to the CBC exercise, respondents also completed a survey which included demographic and attitudinal questions.
Wine labels and wine attributes
Wine labels are important in the wine purchase decision since the majority of wine purchases are unplanned, with consumers unaware of the quality difference between wines (Chaney, 2000; Bombrun & Sumner, 2003) . Moreover, expert reviews that reveal wine quality are typically only available for the minority of wines at the top end of the price spectrum. 2 We decided to focus our analysis on Californian wines produced for the US market. The United States is the largest wine consuming market in the world with retail sales totaling $30 billion in 2010 (Wine . Californian wines dominate the US wine market, accounting for 90 percent of US production and 61 percent of US wine sales, by volume (ibid). The US wine market is an ideal backdrop to investigate the potentially negative effect of eco-labels, owing to potential quality concerns over eco-labeled wine and confusion over wine eco-labels.
Each wine bottle label in our choice set had five attributes: brandname, price, eco-label, region, and varietal.
We created fictitious brands so that we did not need to worry about consumer knowledge and perceptions of existing brands. This was done by selecting names from a list of popular French lastnames. Four different brands were used, Chesnier, Challoner, Rutherfields, and Louis Devere, none of which corresponded to existing wineries. Four price levels were chosen, ranging from $8 to $29 in discrete $7 intervals. 3 This range was chosen after a brief survey of the wine buying behavior of UCLA Anderson Business School faculty and students, and is higher than the $8 average selling price of a Californian wine in the US. Two
Californian wine regions were used: the prestigious and well known Napa Valley and the lesser known and less-prestigious Lodi.To simplify the analysis, all bottles were of the same varietal -cabernet sauvignon. In 2009, cabernet sauvignon was the most popular Californian red wine varietal sold in the US (Wine Institute, 2010) . We specifically chose a red wine to accentuate any potential eco-label quality concerns, for reasons that will be explained below.
The final attribute was eco-labels. Wines labels either had one of two eco-labels or nothing. These eco-labels are discussed below.
Wine eco-labels
In the US wine industry, there are several competing eco-labels related to environmental certification that are still not well recognized and understood by consumers (Delmas, 2008) . Two of these labels are issued by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and follow the U.S. National Organic farming standard, which prohibits the use of additives or alterations to the natural seed or plant, including, but not limited to, pesticides, chemicals, or genetic modification. 4 The first of the USDA standards, "wine made from organically grown grapes", applies only to the production of the grapes, whereas the second, "organic wine", has prescriptions for the wine production process too. In particular, organic wine is prohibited from using sulfites in the wine-making process. Since sulfites help to preserve the wine, stabilize the flavor and eliminate unusual odors, wine produced without added sulfites may be of lower quality (Waterhouse, 2007) .
Such quality concerns are most pertinent for red wines, which are usually kept for longer periods before consumption than white wines. This potential quality check does not apply to wine made with organic grapes, which may add sulfites in the production process. Other wine eco-labels include the internationally administered "biodynamic" label and a variety of regional eco-labels, such as the "Lodi Rules" label.
Eco-labeled wine provides a public good by engaging in environmentally friendly production practices that reduces the environmental degradation associated with conventional wine production, such as groundwater depletion, water pollution, effluent run-off, toxicity of pesticides, fungicides and herbicides, habitat destruction, and loss of natural biodiversity (Warner, 2007) .
Wine attributes and quality
On the private good side, the benefit to consumers of eco-labeled wine is less clear. Wine made from organic grapes is free from pesticides and other potentially harmful toxins, while organic wines do not add sulfites in production. Sulfites have long been associated with various health problems such as asthma (Valley & Thompson 2001) and nasal blockages (Anderson et al 2009) , and are also incorrectly blamed for causing wine-induced headaches (Waterhouse, 2007) . Research has shown that consumers do view organic foods as healthier than conventional products (Loureiro et al, 2001; Miles and Frewer, 2001; Yridoe et al, 2005) , although they may perceive there to be fewer health benefits from processed products such as wine (Forbes et al, 2011) .
Although eco-labeled wine may deliver some health advantages, consumers may perceive its main effect on the private aspect of consumption to be a reduction in quality. Quality concerns may arise for a number of reasons. Firstly, organic wine, which is made without added sulfites, may indeed be of a lower quality than conventionally produced wine. This quality problem may incorrectly spillover to consumer perceptions of wine made from organic grapes, if consumers are unaware of the distinctions between the two labels. In our survey of 830 respondents, we find that although most are familiar with the concept of eco-labeled wines, 67 percent were unaware of the difference between the two labels. Quality concerns may also exist because early generations of eco-labeled wines, like many other eco-labeled products, were often experimental products, made by marginal producers and hence of variable quality (Cox, 2000; Galarraga Gallastegui, 2002; Peattie & Crane, 2005) . This poor quality reputation may persist in the minds of consumer.
In the model of eco-label product choice we posited that price could act as a positive signal of product quality (following Milgrom & Roberts, 1986) . A number of empirical wine demand studies support this supposition. Hedonic wine studies have found that quality, as assessed by professional wine reviewers, is a positive predictor of wine price (Bombrun & Sumner, 2003; Delmas & Grant, 2010; Landon & Smith, 1998) . In study of wine choice in restaurants, where consumers were most likely unaware of wine quality, Durham et al (2004) found that demand increased with price for part of the price range. This was even after controlling for whether a wine was the lowest priced in its respective category. Similar results were obtained in discrete choice and experiments by Lockshin et al (2006 ) & Mtiment & Albisu (2006 .
Region of origin (also known as appelation) has been shown to be a significant predictor of wine quality (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) . Of our two regions, Napa is known as a high quality producer and is the most famous location of wine production outside of Europe (Warner, 2007) . Napa offers an ideal mixture of climate and soil conditions to produce a variety of premium varietals and is the oldest wine producing region in California (ibid). Lodi is less well known than Napa and has only been producing premium quality varietals for the last twenty years (ibid).
Implementation
Each experiment participant completed seven online discrete choice tasks and answered an online survey.
The survey questions followed the discrete choice exercise so as to not bias the discrete choice responses.
Since survey questions were focused on existing behaviors rather than attitudes, we feel it unlikely that participation in the discrete choice exercise caused bias in our survey results.
Recruitment
Potential participants were asked to take part in an online survey related to wine preferences. Flyers advertising the survey were placed in several wine stores across the greater Los Angeles area and advertisements were placed on Facebook wine interest groups with membership totaling almost 100,000
people. Multiple emails were sent by both the authors and an undergraduate research team to professional and social contacts, with 4,845 people directly contacted. These primary contacts were asked to forward the survey to secondary contacts, although quantifiable information on the success of this strategy was not available to the authors. To motivate participation, a case of high quality wine was offered as a prize to a randomly drawn participant. Respondents were unable to take the survey more than once. The survey was taken by 1,142 participants and after removing foreign and incomplete entries, we were left with 883 valid responses. 5 Although the majority of responses were centered in Los Angeles County (57 percent) and
California (82 percent), the remaining respondents were drawn from 31 other U.S. states.
As could be expected given the recruitment methodology, the experiment sample was over-represented by students relative to the general California population. This can be seen in Table 1 , below. This results in a lower average age for the sample than the population. The experiment sample is also more educated and has higher incomes than the general population. This income-education bias is possibly alleviated somewhat in that the true wine buying population of California is possibly wealthier and better educated than the population average. Some support for this is given by a 2009 Gallup poll that showed that a small majority of college grads preferred wine over beer, whereas the vast majority of those who did not attend college preferred beer to wine (Gallup 2009 Respondents report that on average they purchase organic products one out of every three trips to the grocery store, with 36 percent of respondents purchasing organic products on at least half of store visits.
Similarly, about 20 percent of the sample reports being members of an environmental organization. By the nature of the population (young, students) respondents are probably more environmentally friendly or "greener" than average, although it should be noted that green consumerism is an increasingly important trend in the developed world. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), "27% of consumers in OECD countries can be labeled 'green consumers' due to their strong willingness-to-pay and strong environmental activism" (OECD, 2005) . In the U.S. retail sales of organic foods increased from US$3.8 billion in 1997 to US$26.6 billion in 2010 (Organic Trade Association, 2010).
As an additional measure of environmentalism we linked each respondent to their state of resident's League 5 Foreign respondents were removed since it is uncertain what the dollar purchase prices mean to them 6 The same Gallup poll reported that 65 percent of Americans consumed some alcoholic beverage in the past week, which is comparable to the 65 percent of our sample who report drinking wine at least once a week.
of Conservation Voters (LCV) environmental rating for 2010.
Discrete Choice Exercise
Experiment participants were initially asked to complete seven choice tasks. In each choice task the respondent was asked to imagine that he/she was attending a seated dinner party with family and friends and needed to choose a bottle of wine to bring along for the occasion. Respondents were then presented with images of four different bottles of wine, each with a different price. The images were truncated to put focus on the wine bottle labels. Subjects were asked to choose which bottle of wine they would purchase, with the option of choosing to purchase none of them. Respondents selected their prefered option by clicking on it.
An example of a choice task is shown in figure 1 Each bottle of wine had one level of each of the five attributes. The levels of the attributes were randomized across the 28 different choice tasks (4x7) using Sawtooth Software's Choice-Based Conjoint Software. An algorithm was used to insure each level of each attribute appeared an equal number of times across all surveys, but did not repeat in the wine bottles within each choice task. This was done to make sure that the respondent did not see the same level, (e.g., the same price) across all the choices in one task. To ensure that the choice set was not dominated by eco-label wines, we doubled the number of non-eco-labeled wines.
Thus every choice set had one organic wine, one made with organic grapes wine and two non-eco-labeled
wines. Table II , shows each of the attribute levels and its display and selection frequency.
***
[Insert Table 2 about here] ***
Econometric Specification
Each subject was given 7 discrete choice tasks to complete ( 1..7]  C ). In each task the subject was asked to choose between hypthetically purchasing one of 4 different bottles of wine, or buying none of them. Each bottle of wine is respresented by a vector of attributes ,
indicates the none option. No bottles of wine were repeated for a given consumer. The ordering of the discrete choice tasks were randomized across consumers, although within a given choice task the four bottles always appear in the same order (which resulted from an initial randomization).
Individual attributes were obtained from the survey and are represented by vector ,
interaction between subject and product attributes is
The outcome variable C ij y , is a dummy variable indicating whether the bottle was purchased or not.
The utility subject i gets from bottle j is:
 is an individual-specific taste shock. If we assume that within choice C, C ikj  is i.i.d and distributed extreme value type 1, we get the familiar logit equation:
To account for repeated choice tasks by each subject, we cluster standard errors at the subject level.
Results

8.1.
Preferences over eco-labeled wine *** [Insert Table 3 about here]
In Table III we examine preferences for eco-labeled and non-eco-labeled wine. All comparisons are with respect to a non-eco-labeled wine from Lodi, priced at $8. Equation 1 examines whether consumers have an absolute preference for eco-labeled over non-eco-labeled wines, where this preference does not vary with other wine characteristics (hypothesis 1). Consumers are slightly more likely to purchase eco-labeled wine (2.4 percentage points), but this difference disappears in equation 2, when we include individual level controls. Only those respondents who buy a high proportion of organic already, and/or who are members of environmental organizations prefer eco-labeled over non-eco-labeled wine. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 2 . In both equations we can see that consumers prefer wine from Napa and wine priced at $15.
Interestingly, those respondents who are wealthier, better educated, spend more on wine and drink wine frequently are less likely to choose eco-labeled wines.
[Insert Figure 2 about here] ***
In equation 3, we allow the eco-label to interact with other quality signals to see whether the preference for eco-labeled products decreases with other quality signals (hypothesis 2). We interact the eco-label with a dummy for if the price is high (price=22 or price=29) and a dummy for Napa. We find that consumers are 14.6 percent more likely to buy an eco-labeled than non-eco-labeled product when the price is low and the wine is from Lodi. However, when the price is high and the wine comes from Napa, this preference reverse, with consumers being 13.1 percent more likely to buy a non-eco-labeled wine over an eco-labeled wine. These results indicate that respondents obtain some warm glow value from eco-labeled wine, but also interpret it as a signal of low quality. If respondents made no inferences over wine quality, they would always prefer an eco-labeled wine over an otherwise identical non-eco-labeled wine, regardless of other attributes. Instead we find that preferences over eco-labeled wine vary with these other attributes. One interpretation of the data is that when respondents have already inferred that a wine is low quality from price and other attributes, then the additional low quality signal from the eco-label is unimportant, and respondents receive just the warm glow of eco-consumption. However, as price and other quality signals increase, the eco-labels quality signal becomes more pertinent and outweighs the warm-glow of eco-consumption, shifting preferences towards non-eco-labeled wine. These findings support hypothesis two over hypothesis one, since preference over eco-labels in indeed relative rather than absolute.
Knowledge and preferences over eco-label types
In table IV we examine consumer preferences over the two different USDA eco-labels; organic and made with organic grapes. Organic wine undergoes a different production process to non-organic wine often resulting in inferior quality. The same is not true of wine made with organic grapes. Thus it should not suffer from the same quality penalty as organic wines. Again comparisons are made with respect to a non-eco-labeled wine from Lodi, priced at $8. We exclude individual controls in this specification because our sample size does not permit us to include separate individual coefficients for each eco-label type in addition to the increased number of eco-labels and interactions. 7 ***
[Insert Table 4 about here]
*** Equation 1 shows that there is no difference in how consumers evaluate organic wine and wine made from organic grapes. Apart from the coefficient on eco-label interacted with Napa, there are no significant differences between consumer preferences for the two different eco-labels. This indicates that quality concerns about organic wine are potentially being incorrectly attributed to wine made with organic grapes.
Presumably consumers who are aware of the difference between the two eco-labels would not make this mistake. We examine this in regression 2, by estimating separate coefficients for the eco-label price penalty for those who are informed of the difference and those who are not. Regression 2 shows that those who are informed do not on place as high a premium on low priced eco-labeled wine as uninformed respondents, but value the two eco-labels equally. 8 More importantly, informed consumers do place a price penalty on 7 The inclusion of individual controls results in unstable coefficients that swing wildly when insignificant controls are added or removed. 8 In fact eco-label + eco-label*informed is not significantly different from zero. organic wine, but no price penalty on wine made from organic grapes. 9 Uninformed consumers place an identical price penalty on both eco-labels. This is illustrated graphically in We interpret these results as signifying that consumers who know that wine made with organic grapes is produced in the same fashion as non-eco-labeled wine do not put a quality penalty on wine made with organic grapes. Interestingly, despite the superior quality input of organic grapes, these consumers do place an absolute premium on this wine. On the other hand, consumers who are unaware of this difference tend to treat organic wine and wine made with organic grapes similarly, imposing a perceived quality penalty on both.
Reputation and brand name
In our discrete choice exercise we used fictitious wine brands, so that our results would not be conflated by existing consumer brand beliefs. However brand names may be a strong quality signal that can overcome the quality-tradeoff that eco-labels present. Some insight into this question can be gained by looking at the effects of region, which can act as meta-brand for wines, signifying common quality levels for all producers (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) . If a quality brand was sufficient to overcome quality concerns for eco-labeled wines, then we would expect the interaction between brand and eco-label to be weakly positive. However, when we examine the interaction between the meta-brand Napa and eco-labels in Table III , we find a negative coefficient, implying that the high quality signal given by region is insufficient to over-ride the low quality signal given by eco-label. Individual winemakers seem to be aware of this, with a number of high quality wine makers producing eco-certified wine, without labeling it as such (Delmas & Grant) . Relative demand by region is displayed graphically in Table V. *** 9 These coefficients are significantly different from each other (Prob > chi2 = 0.0374).
[Insert Figure V about here] ***
Discussion and Conclusion
Eco-labels are often developed by government agencies and non-governmental organizations which are separate to the industries that produce and sell the eco-product. The goal of these agencies is to reduce the information asymmetry between producers and consumers over the environmental attributes of a good. If an eco-label is effective it will command a premium amongst environmentally minded consumers and thus allow manufacturers to recoup the additional costs of cleaner manufacturing practices. However, by focusing on the information asymmetry between producers and consumers, rather than how the label meets consumer needs, agencies may develop eco-labels that send an irrelevant, confusing or detrimental message to consumers.
We develop a model where consumers receive a "warm glow" from eco-consumption, but also view the eco-label as a signal of low quality. We tested this empirically with an online discrete choice experiment focused on choices over eco-labeled wines. In the US there are two government certified eco-labels for wine. One label is associated with potentially low quality production techniques, while the other is not. The majority of the 830 participants in our experiment were unaware of the difference between these two labels.
We found that respondents preferred eco-labeled wines over an otherwise identical counterpart, when the price was low and the wine was from a low quality region. However these preferences were reversed if the wine was expensive and from a high quality region. These results indicate that respondents obtain some warm glow value from eco-labeled wine, but also interpret it as a signal of low quality. If respondents made no inferences over wine quality, they would always prefer an eco-labeled wine over an otherwise identical non-eco-labeled wine, regardless of other attributes. One interpretation of these results is that when respondents have already inferred that a wine is low quality from price and other attributes, then the additional low quality signal from the eco-label is unimportant, and respondents receive just the warm glow of eco-consumption. However, as price and other quality signals increase, the eco-labels quality signal becomes more pertinent and outweighs the warm-glow of eco-consumption, shifting preferences towards non-eco-labeled wine. This eco-quality penalty holds for both types of eco-labels, even though it should only apply to the eco-label associated with quality concerns. However, for the minority of respondents who were informed of the difference between the two eco-labels, the eco-quality penalty applied only to the potentially low quality label. This suggests a potential solution to the problem, in the form of consumer education.
By ignoring potential quality signals from eco-labels, the market for eco-labeled wine has been severely limited. Government certified eco-labeled wine obtained just 0.1% of the overall wine market in 2009, compared with 3.5% for the overall market for similar government eco-labels for other eco-labeled products (Wine Institute, 2010) . This lack of market penetration combined with consumer confusion has opened up the door to a number of other unregulated eco-labels, which may be less green than government certified eco-labels. These eco-labels may create further confusion and erode credibility in the eco-wine market.
The lessons from the wine industry for other eco-labeling initiatives are clear. An eco-label premium is essential for an eco-industry to sustainably exist. Thus any eco-labeling initiative needs to ensure that it will deliver such premiums. Focusing purely on information asymmetries will not necessarily create eco-labels that align eco-products with the needs of consumers. Instead government organizations need to work with producers and marketers to ensure that eco-labels provide information that clearly communicate their value proposition to consumers, without creating further confusion, or additional unintended product signals. (0.0339) -0.000818*** -0.000803*** (0.000203) (0.000201) -0.0767*** -0.0772*** (0.0270) (0.0270) -0.00573*** -0.00563*** (0.00138) (0.00136) 0.412*** 0.405*** (0.0421) (0.0415) 0.0927*** 0.0900*** (0.0271) (0.0260) Observations 6181 6181 6181 6181 Robust standard errors in parentheses errors clustered by individual marginal effects reported † P high = 1(Price=22 or Price=29) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Omi tted va ri a bl es : Eco-label: age, male, spends nothing, informed, heard, tasted, LCV score, income missing, LCV missing . Buy none: constant and full set of individual characteristics . Product Characteristics: Rutherfields, Challoner, Louis Devere. Table III Conditional logistic choice model representing choices between 4 wines and buy nothing. Half of the wines had eco-labels, while price, label name and region varied randomly across choices. All coefficients below are marginal effects and are calculated with respect to the base case of a non-eco-labeled, $8 wine from Lodi. 
Significant Individual Characteristics Effect on Eco-Label
Eco-label
Napa
Conditional logistic choice model representing choices between 4 wines and buy nothing.
Half of the wines had eco-labels, while price, label name and region varied randomly across choices. All coefficients below are marginal effects and are calculated with respect to the base case of a non-eco-labeled, $8 wine from Lodi.
Table IV
Omi tted va ri a bl es : Buy none: constant . Product Characteristics: Napa, price=15, price=22, price=29, Rutherfields, Challoner, Louis Devere. 
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